The following opinions were released by the United States Supreme Court on June 25, 2009:

• Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (Opinion of the Court by Scalia, J., joined by Stevens, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, JJ.; concurrence by Thomas, J.; dissent by Kennedy, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., Breyer, Alito, JJ.) (certiorari to Mass. App. Ct.) (Sixth Amendment - forensic reports). Reversing the Massachusetts court;s judgment that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights weren’t violated by the introduction of “certificates” from the state lab regarding the character and quality of narcotics introduced as evidence in the defendant’s drug possession trial. The Supreme Court held that the “certificates” were affidavits, the authors of whom should be subject to confrontation through cross-examination. The Court held that forensic analyses are not a special class of evidence immune from Confrontation Clause protection: “Respondent and the dissent may be right that there are other ways — and in some cases better ways — to challenge or verify the results of a forensic test. But the Constitution guarantees one way: confrontation. We do not have license to suspend the Confrontation Clause when a preferable trial strategy is available. Nor is it evident that what respondent calls ‘neutral scientific testing’ is as neutral or as reliable as respondent suggests. Forensic evidence is not uniquely immune from the risk of manipulation.” Slip op. at 12. The Court observed that a “forensic analyst responding to a request from a law enforcement official may feel pressure — or have an incentive — to alter the evidence in a manner favorable to the prosecution. Confrontation is one means of assuring accurate forensic analysis.” Slip op. at 12-13. Justice Thomas wrote separately in concurrence “to adhere to [his] position that ‘the Confrontation Clause is implicated by extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.’” Thomas op. at 1. In dissent, Justice Kennedy opined that the majority’s ruling ran afoul of 90 years of jurisprudence, and that, in light of the majority opinion, “we have misinterpreted the Confrontation Clause — hardly an arcane or seldom-used provision of the Constitution — for the first 218 years of its existence.” Kennedy op. at 1. Justice Kennedy made the distinction between “ordinary” witnesses and the laboratory analysts at issue, observing that laboratory analysts’ testimony would not be altered by having to face the accused. Justice Kennedy distilled his disagreement with the majority, writing, “The Court’s opinion suggests this will be a body of formalistic and wooden rules, divorced from precedent, common sense, and the underlying purpose of the Clause. Its ruling has vast potential to disrupt criminal procedures that already give ample protections against the misuse of scientific evidence.” Kennedy op. at 2.
• Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend (Opinion of the Court by Thomas, J., joined by Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, JJ.; dissent by Alito, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., Scalia, Kennedy, JJ.) (certiorari to U.S. 11th Cir.) (maritime law - maintenance and cure, punitive damages). Affirming the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit that punitive damages are available to an injured seaman asserting a maintenance and cure claim following his injury aboard the tugboat on which he was employed. The Supreme Court held that punitive damages have historically been available in the federal maritime law context, and that “[n]othing in maritime law undermines the applicability of this general rule in the maintenance and cure context.” Slip op. at 7. The Court then turned to the Jones Act, and found that it did not replace the common law remedies available for claims of maintenance and cure. The Court concluded, “Limiting recovery for maintenance and cure to whatever is permitted by the Jones Act would give greater pre-emptive effect to the Act than is required by its text, Miles, or any of this Court’s other decisions interpreting the statute.” Slip op. at 19. Justice Alito dissented, opining that the Miles framework dictated deferring to the limited remedies available in the Jones Act.
• Horne v. Flores (Opinion of the Court by Alito, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, JJ.; dissent by Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, JJ.) (certiorari to U.S. 9th Cir.) (Equal Education Opportunities Act - overcoming language barriers). Reversing the Ninth Circuit’s judgment that the defendant schools officials were violating the requirement of the Equal Education Opportunities Act (”EEOA”) to take appropriate action to overcome language barriers, in their incremental funding of Englich Language-Learner (”ELL”) programs. The Supreme Court held that the district court’s and the Ninth Circuit’s focus on the incremental funding of the ELL programs was too narrow, ignoring other efforts being taken by the schools to address the EEOA requirement to take action to overcome language barriers. Accordingly, the Court held that the Ninth Circuit erred in not granting the school officials’ Rule 60(b)(5) motion arguing that continued enforcement of the prospective relief was no longer equitable. The Court observed that “institutional reform injunctions often raise sensitive federalism concerns,” and that “[f]ederalism concerns are heightened when, as in these cases, a federal court decree has the effect of dictating state or local budget priorities.” Slip op. at 11. The Court therefore held that a flexible approach to Rule 60(b)(5) allowed courts to adequately balance these concerns, and that the lower courts did not “fairly consider” the changed circumstances. The Court held that the schools’ implementation of a separate structured English immersion (”SEI”) approach addressed the EEOA duties in spite of the incremental ELL funding, such that the schools should be granted relief from the district court’s initial injunctive orders as to the ELL funding. Dissenting, Justice Breyer opined that the majority “misapplies an inappropriate procedural framework, reaching a result that neither the record nor the law adequately supports. In doing so, it risks denying schoolchildren the English-learning instruction necessary ‘to overcome language barriers that impede’ their ‘equal participation.’ 20 U. S. C. § 1703(f).” Breyer op. at 3.
• Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding (Opinion of the Court by Souter, J., joined in full by Roberts, C.J., Scalia, Kennedy, Breyer, Alito, JJ., and joined as to Parts I-III by Stevens, Ginsburg, JJ.; Stevens, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Ginsburg, J.; Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part; Thomas, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part) (certiorari to U.S. 9th Cir.) (Fourth Amendment - qualified immunity). Affirming in part and reversing in part the en banc Ninth Circuit’s judgment that the search of a student’s bra and underwear for prescription drugs violated the student’s Fourth Amendment right to freedom from search and seizure and that the school officials were not entitled to qualified immunity. The Supreme Court held that the student’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated where the school officials had no reasonable suspicion that the search of the underclothes would reveal contraband. The Court then held, however, that this Fourth Amendment right was not clearly established at the time of the search, and that the school officials were therefore entitled to qualified immunity. The Court held that “[t]he very fact of [the student’s] pulling her underwear away from her body in the presence of the two officials who were able to see her necessarily exposed her breasts and pelvic area to some degree, and both subjective and reasonable societal expectations of personal privacy support the treatment of such a search as categorically distinct, requiring distinct elements of justification on the part of school authorities for going beyond a search of outer clothing and belongings.” Slip op. at 8. The Court held that the threat - possession of common painkillers equivalent to two Advil or one Alleve, in violation of school policy against possession of any medication without school approval - did not match the degree of intrusion; and that the school officials had no reason to suspect that the student was hiding the medication in her underwear (which the search revealed that she was not). The Court held, however, that the school officials were entitled to qualified immunity because the previous decisions in lower courts had not clearly established the parameters of the Fourth Amendment right: “the cases viewing school strip searches differently from the way we see them are numerous enough, with well-reasoned majority and dissenting opinions, to counsel doubt that we were sufficiently clear in the prior statement of law.” Slip op. at 12. Justice Stevens concurred with the Court’s finding of a Fourth Amendment violation, but dissented from the finding that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity, reiterating his pronouncement from a previous case that “[i]t does not require a constitutional scholar to conclude that a nude search of a 13-year-old child is an invasion of constitutional rights of some magnitude.” Stevens op. at 1. Justice Thomas concurred with the judgment that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity, but dissented from the finding of a Fourth Amendment violation. He opined that the majority opinion “imposes a vague and amorphous standard on school administrators. It also grants judges sweeping authority to second-guess the measures that these officials take to maintain discipline in their schools and ensure the health and safety of the students in their charge.” Thomas op. at 1.