The following opinions were released by the U.S. Supreme Court on June 19, 2008:

• Kentucky Retirement Systems v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Opinion of the Court by Breyer, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., Stevens, Souter, Thomas, JJ.; dissenting opinion by Kennedy, J., joined by Scalia, Ginsburg, Alito, JJ.). Public hazardous duty employees in Kentucky (e.g.,police officers, firefighter, corrections workers) participate in a pension plan that operates as follows: under the “normal” plan, workers are eligible after twenty years of employment or after five years employment if they are at least 55 years old; under the “disability” plan, additional years are imputed to the plan formula if a disability halts employment prior to reaching one of the normal plan targets. The effect of calculations under the plan could lead to disparate pension benefits for older employees. In one such case, where the employee became disabled after reaching the targets under the normal plan, the employee brought an Age Discrimination in Employment Act claim to the EEOC, which filed suit against the Kentucky entities, pointing out that, had the employee become disabled before reaching age 55, he would have been entitled to imputation of additional years into the benefits calculation and was denied that extra benefit simply by fact of being over age 55. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, which was affirmed by the Sixth Circuit. The Supreme Court held that, for ADEA claims, courts must be careful to treat age and pension status as distinct. The Court found that Kentucky’s plan and its effects came from a complex system of factors, that it was clearly aimed toward a legitimate objective of achieving fair benefits for disabled employees, that the plan could just as easily operate to benefit an older worker because of his age under different circumstances, that the plan does not trigger any of the stereotyping factors as to which the ADEA remedies were targeted, and that it would be difficult to craft a plan that was both completely age neutral and that addressed the legitimate objectives at which the plan was aimed. The Court, therefore, agreed with the district court’s ruling that the plan’s provisions were not “actually motivated” by age. The Court also found that the EEOC Compliance Manual did not require any different result because its contrary conclusion lacked the power to persuade the Court under the Skidmore analysis. Dissenting, Justice Kennedy wrote that the majority decision undercut the basic framework of ADEA jurisprudence, that “When an employer makes age a factor in an employee benefit plan in a formal, facial, deliberate, and explicit manner, to the detriment of older employees, this is a violation of the Act. Disparate treatment on the basis of age is prohibited unless some exemption or defense provided in the Act applies.” Dissent slip op. at 1.
• Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory (Opinion of the Court by Souter, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Alito, JJ., and Thomas, J., as to Parts I and II.A; concurring opinion by Scalia, J.; opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part by Thomas, J.; Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration of this case). In a lay-off of thirty-one employees by the defendant government contractor, thirty were at least forty years old, and twenty-eight sued under the ADEA. The defendant argued that the factors relied on making the lay-offs were “reasonable factors other than age” (”RFOA”) under the ADEA exemption at 29 USC § 623(f)(1). The Supreme Court held that the RFOA exemption is an affirmative defense as to which the employer claiming the exemption bears the burden of proof. Justice Thomas concurred in part and dissented in part to reiterate his disagreement that the ADEA provides for disparate impact claims, though he agreed that the RFOA exemption was an affirmative defense for disparate treatment claims.
• Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn (Opinion of the Court by Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, Alito, JJ., and by Roberts, C.J., except as to Part IV; partial concurring opinion by Roberts, C.J.; opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part by Kennedy, J.; dissenting opinion by Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J.). MetLife serves as both administrator and insurer for Sears’ ERISA plan, making eligibility determinations and making benefits payments. MetLife denied permanent disability payments to a Sears employee; in setting aside MetLife’s denial of benefits, the Court of Appeals considered as one factor the conflict of interest in MetLife’s dual role as plan administrator and benefits payor. The Supreme Court held that the dual role was the type of conflict of interest that should be considered as a factor in review of an eligibility determination. The Court held that the consideration accorded to the factor did not convert the review standard from the deferential standard to be applied, but that “conflicts are but one factor among many that a reviewing judge must take into account. Benefits decisions arise in too many contexts, concern too many circumstances, and can relate in too many different ways to conflicts—which themselves vary in kind and in degree of seriousness—for us to come up with a one-size-fits-all procedural system that is likely to promote fair and accurate review.” Slip op. at 10. Chief Justice Roberts’s disagreement with Part IV of the opinion was as to how the majority would factor in the conflict; the Chief Justice would consider the conflict “only where there is evidence that the benefits denial was motivated or affected by the administrator’s conflict.” Concurring slip op. at 1. Justice Kennedy would have remanded to the Court of Appeals for determination under the majority’s new framework. Dissenting, Justice Scalia noted that he would apply the standard used for conflicts in the trust context, that an administrator “does not abuse its discretion unless the conflict actually and improperly motivates the decision.” Dissenting slip op. at 1.
• Chamber of Commerce of United States of America v. Brown (Opinion of the Court by Stevens, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Alito, JJ.; dissenting opinion by Breyer, J., joined by Ginsburg, J.). California’s Assembly Bill 1899 (”AB 1899″) prohibits the expenditure of state funds by an employer to promote or deter union organization, and imposes a treble damages clause for any such prohibited expenditure. The prohibition extends to actions of allowing union organizers onto the employment site and to entering into a voluntary cooperation agreement with a union. The district court ruled that the National Labor Relations Act (”NLRA”) pre-empts provisions of AB 1899 concerning grants and program funds. The Ninth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court held that the provisions “are preempted under Machinists because they regulate within a zone protected and reserved for market freedom.” Slip op. at 5. Dissenting, Justice Breyer opined that the provisions of AB 1899 do not “amount to regulation that the NLRA pre-empts.” Dissenting slip op. at 1.
• Indiana v. Edwards (Opinion of the Court by Breyer, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Alito, JJ.; dissenting opinion by Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J.). The defendant was found competent to assist his attorneys in his defense, but not competent to represent himself; he challenged his conviction, in part, on the basis that the trial court’s decision to go ahead with trial in this situation denied him the constitutional right to defend himself. The Supreme Court held that a state may compel a defendant to proceed to trial represented by counsel where he meets the mental competency standard for assisting counsel with his defense but is not found competent to represent himself. Justice Scalia, in dissent, opined that “the Constitution does not permit a State to substitute its own perception of fairness for the defendant’s right to make his own case before the jury—a specific right long understood as essential to a fair trial.” Dissent slip op. at 1.