The following opinions were released by the U.S. Supreme Court on June 23, 2008:

• Rothgery v. Gillespie County, Texas (Opinion of the Court by Souter, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, JJ.; concurring opinion by Roberts, C.J., joined by Scalia, J.; concurring opinion by Alito, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., Scalia, J.; dissenting opinion by Thomas, J.). Although the petitioner had never been convicted of a felony, an erroneous notation in a search of his criminal background revealed that he had, so he was arrested on charges of being a felon in possession of a firearm; because the arresting officers had no arrest warrant, he was immediately brought in front of a magistrate pursuant to Texas criminal procedure, for a probable-cause determination and apprisal of the defendant as to the charges against him. The petitioner here asked several times for an attorney to be appointed for him, which request was unheeded; he spent six months in jail upon being unable to post bail before an attorney was appointed to represent him. At that point, his appointed attorney discovered the error in the criminal background, and the district attorney agreed to dismiss the indictment. The petitioner brought a § 1983 claim against the county for failure to appoint counsel for him timely. The district court dismissed his claim, and the U.S. Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that its precedent was that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not attach until “the relevant prosecutors” were aware of the arrest and became involved in the prosecution. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded. Under the Court’s precedent, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is triggered by the commencement of prosecution, at the initiation of adverse judicial proceedings. The Supreme Court held as erroneous the Fifth Circuit’s opinion that, in the context of Texas’s magistrate hearing, this point did not occur until a prosecutor was involved in such a proceeding: “Under this standard of prosecutorial awareness, attachment depends not on whether a first appearance has begun adversary judicial proceedings, but on whether the prosecutor had a hand in starting it. That standard is wrong.” Slip op. at 13. Chief Justice Roberts concurred to emphasize that, while he found Justice Thomas’s dissent compelling, the Court’s result was compelled by Brewer and Jackson. Justice Alito concurred to emphasize his understanding that the Court’s opinion was narrowly focused on the issue of “attachment” of the Sixth Amendment right, not on the substantive entitlement of a defendant to the assistance of counsel. Dissenting, Justice Thomas opined that the Court’s opinion departs from the original constitutional meaning of “criminal prosecution” for purposes of the attachment of the Sixth Amendment right.
• Greenlaw v. United States (Opinion of the Court by Ginsburg, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, JJ.; opinion concurring in judgment by Breyer, J.; dissenting opinion by Alito, J., joined by Stevens, J., and Breyer, J., as to Parts I, II, and III). After the defendant was convicted of various drug and weapons offenses and sentenced to 442 months’ imprisonment, he appealed his sentence as unreasonably long. The government did not cross-appeal, but the Eighth Circuit nevertheless found sua sponte that the sentence plainly was fifteen years too short, and remanded with an order for the district court to resentence the defendant to 622 months. The government had objected to the sentencing at the district court, and had pointed out the error in its brief to the appellate court, but had not chosen to cross-appeal on the issue or to ask the Eighth Circuit for a higher sentence. The government also did not oppose the defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari, conceding the defendant’s argument that the Eighth Circuit did not have the power sua sponte to impose a higher sentence on appeal. The Supreme Court granted review and invited an amicus party to brief the case in defense of the action taken by the Eighth Circuit. The Supreme Court vacated the Eighth Circuit’s judgment. The Court found that the Eighth Circuit was correct that the district court had committed the error in sentencing, and that the error was plain error. The Court then held, nevertheless, that the government prosecutors should be accorded all deference in the decision as to whether to appeal sentencing errors. The Court noted that it needed not go so far as to characterize the cross-appeal rule, generally, as a jurisdictional requirement. The Court did hold, however, that there is no support for a plain-error exception to the cross-appeal requirement. Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment, opining that the Supreme Court’s review of the courts of appeals discretion in acting contrary to the prudential rule of the cross-appeal requirement should seldom be used. Dissenting, Justice Alito opined that the cross-appeal rule was merely a rule of practice, and not jurisdictional, and on that the majority opinion resulted in a rule that “a reviewing court should enjoy less discretion to correct an error sua sponte than it enjoys to raise and address an argument sua sponte.” Dissent slip op. at 1.
• Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC Services, Inc. (Opinion of the Court by Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, JJ.; dissenting opinion by Roberts, C.J., joined by Scalia, Thomas, Alito, JJ.). Individual payphone operators assigned their claims against long distance carriers for “dial-around” calls to an “aggregator,” which brought suit alleging the aggregated claims against the long distance carriers. The long distance carriers argued that the aggregators lack standing, as assignees of the actual claims, under Article III; the district court and D.C. Circuit disagreed. The Supreme Court likewise affirmed that the aggregator/assignee did have standing to pursue the payphone operators/assignors’ claims. After an extensive historical review, the Supreme Court found “well-nigh conclusive” in its review of the Article III question “[t]he history and precedents . . . that courts have long found ways to allow assignees to bring suit; that where assignment is at issue, courts — both before and after the founding — have always permitted the party with legal title alone to bring suit; and that there is a strong tradition specifically of suits by assignees for collection.” Slip op. at 16. The Court then held that the assignee’s claim meets the redressability and injury-in-fact analyses of modern standing analysis. The Court then rejected the petitioners’ arguments for prudential barriers to standing. Chief Justice Roberts dissented on the basis that the assignee plaintiff has nothing to gain from the prosecution of the suit, and that the redressability analysis fails.