The following opinions, the last of the 2007-08 Court Term, were released by the U.S. Supreme Court on June 26, 2008:

• Davis v. Federal Election Commission (Opinion of the Court by Alito, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, JJ., and joined as to Part II by Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, JJ.; opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part by Stevens, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, JJ.; opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part by Ginsburg, J., joined by Breyer, J.). Under the “millionaire’s amendment” to federal election law contribution limits for congressional campaigns, when a candidate is “self-financing,” i.e., the candidate’s personal contributions to her own campaign cause the OPFA to exceed $350,000, then the individual contribution limits applicable to an opponent’s campaign are trebled, from $2300 to $6900, and coordinated campaign expenditures from a political party are limitless. An unsuccessful, self-financing candidate for a congressional seat in New York during the 2006 election cycle was fined by the Federal Election Commission for failure to follow reporting requirements. The district court determined that it had standing to review the candidate’s challenge, then granted summary judgment in favor of the FEC. Review was directly to the Supreme Court, which reversed. The Court first held that the candidate had standing as to both the challenge to the notification requirements and to the asymmetric funding limits triggered by his declaration of self-financing status. The Court then held that the challenge had not been mooted by the conclusion of the 2006 election, because the injury was capable of repetition, yet evading review, due to the cyclical nature of the election seasons. The Court then held that the asymmetric spending limits impermissibly burdened the candidate’s First Amendment right to spend his own money to finance campaign speech; it found that the “millionaire’s amendment” “imposes an unprecedented penalty on any candidate who robustly exercises that First Amendment right.” Slip op. at 12. The Court found that the goal of reducing the natural advantage for wealthy candidates who choose to self-finance was not a legitimate government objective. Because the disclosure requirements were designed to implement the unconstitutional asymmetric funding provisions, the Court also found that those requirements were likewise unconstitutional. In partial dissent, Justice Stevens wrote to agree with the district court’s “thorough and well-reasoned opinion … that because the Millionaire’s Amendment does not impose any burden whatsoever on the self-funding candidate’s freedom to speak, it does not violate the First Amendment, and because it does no more than diminish the unequal strength of the self-funding candidate, it does not violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment.” Stevens Dissent Slip op. at 1. Justice Stevens wrote that “a number of purposes, both legitimate and substantial, may justify the imposition of reasonable limitations on the expenditures permitted during the course of any single campaign. For one, such limitations would free candidates and their staffs from the interminable burden of fundraising. … Moreover, the imposition of reasonable limitations would likely have the salutary effect of improving the quality of the exposition of ideas. After all, orderly debate is always more enlightening than a shouting match that awards points on the basis of decibels rather than reasons.” Id. at 2. Justice Ginsburg wrote separately to partially dissent to emphasize that she did not join in Justice Stevens’ expressed willingness to overturn Buckley, since that issue had not been briefed.
• District of Columbia v. Heller (Opinion of the Court by Scalia, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ.; dissenting opinion by Stevens, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, JJ.; dissenting opinion by Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, JJ.). Under an ordinance in the District of Columbia, carrying unregistered handguns is prohibited, and registration of handguns is prohibited; separately, carrying of unlicensed handguns is prohibited, though the chief of police may issue one-year licenses; also, subject to narrow exceptions, all lawfully owned firearms must be kept unloaded, disassembled, and bound by a trigger lock or similar device. Dick Heller, a D.C. special police officer, sought to register a handgun to keep in his home, was denied, and filed this challenge to D.C.’s gun ordinance as invalid on Second Amendment grounds. Because the Second Amendment refers to “the Right of the People,” the Court held that there was a strong presumption that the right announced in the amendment, like the rights labeled elsewhere in the Bill of Rights as a “right of the people,” was an individual right as opposed to a collective right. The Court then engaged in an historical analysis of the term “arms” to find that the right “to Keep and Bear Arms” referred to personal weapons used traditionally in self-defense, not necessarily military-specific weapons. The Court then found that keeping arms and bearing arms were not terms limited to militia-oriented use, but to keeping or carrying weapons for the purpose of defense and confrontation. The Court then held, “[p]utting all of these textual elements together, … that they guarantee the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.” Slip op. at 19. After an explanation of how its holding comported with the historical contemporary understanding of the right to keep and bear arms, the Court noted, “we do not read the Second Amendment to protect the right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation, just as we do not read the First Amendment to protect the right of citizens to speak for any purpose.” Slip op. at 22. The Court then rejected the idea that the Second Amendment’s prefatory clause limited the extent of the right to arms kept and borne for purposes of use in a well-regulated militia: “The prefatory clause does not suggest that preserving the militia was the only reason Americans valued the ancient right; most undoubtedly thought it even more important for self-defense and hunting. But the threat that the new Federal Government would destroy the citizens’ militia by taking away their arms was the reason that right — unlike some other English rights — was codified in a written Constitution.” Slip op. at 26. The Court expressly held that its opinion should not be read to cast doubt on laws restricting ownership of firearms by felons or the mentally ill; or the carrying of firearms in sensitive areas, such as around schools; or restrictions on the carrying out of commercial activities related to the sale of firearms. The Court then held that the handguns prohibited under the D.C. ordinance are the predominant choice for use in self-defense, the core purpose of the Second Amendment right, and that the requirement to use trigger locks in the home renders nugatory the use of such weapons for this protected purpose in the arena where the need for self-defense is most acute. “In sum, we hold that the District’s ban on handgun possession in the home violates the Second Amendment, as does its prohibition against rendering any lawful firearm in the home operable for the purpose of immediate self-defense. Assuming that Heller is not disqualified from the exercise of Second Amendment rights, the District must permit him to register his handgun and must issue him a license to carry it in the home.” Slip op. at 64 (emphases added). Justice Stevens dissented on the basis that the Second Amendment’s right was limited to the right of the people to keep and bear arms for the purpose of maintaining a well-regulated militia, and did not extend the right for any other constitutionally protected purpose. Justice Breyer dissented to emphasize that the D.C. ordinance was not an unreasonable restriction on the Second Amendment right, even insofar as the right could be read to extend constitutional protections to the purpose of self-defense.
• Morgan Stanley Capital Group, Inc. v. Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County (Opinion of the Court by Scalia, J., joined by Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., and as to Part III by Ginsburg, J.; opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment by Ginsburg, J.; dissenting opinion by Stevens, J., joined by Souter, J.; Roberts, C.J., and Breyer, J., took no part in consideration of the case). The Court held that, with regard to FERC regulatory decisions as to rate-setting, “[t]here is only one statutory standard for assessing wholesale electricity rates, whether set by contract or tariff — the just-and-reasonable standard.” Slip op. at 16. The Court held, however, that “only when the mutually agreed-upon contract rate seriously harms the consuming public may the Commission declare it not to be just and reasonable.” Slip op. at 17. The Court then rejected “that a ‘zone of reasonableness’ test should be used to evaluate a buyer’s challenge that a rate is too high. In our view that fails to accord an adequate level of protection to contracts.” Slip op. at 19.