The following opinions were released by the Louisiana Supreme Court on July 1, 2008:

• State v. Hatton (opinion by Kimball, J.). The defendant was arrested and charged with two counts of computer-aided solicitation of a minor. Prior to trial, the defendant moved to quash the Bill of Information on the basis that La. R.S. § 14:81.3 was unconstitutional under the Louisiana Constitution’s equal protection provisions, and that it was unconstitutional under the Louisiana and U.S. Constitution’s rights to present a defense. The trial court found that the statute did violate the constitution, though there was confusion in the oral reasons as to what provision of which constitution the ruling was grounded in; the state supreme court requested a per curiam to clarify the ruling, which the trial court provided, citing a provision of the state constitution (access to the courts) that was not actually briefed to the trial court. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, vacated, and remanded on the basis that the grounds cited by the trial court had not been properly particularized and briefed by the parties.
• Ryan v. Zurich American Insurance Co. (opinion by Victory, J.; Calogero, C.J., Kimball, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part; Johnson, J., dissenting). Plaintiff in this case arising from injuries incurred in an automobile accident was awarded $0 by a jury for loss of future earnings capacity (though he was awarded a total of $150,000 for various other specified damages). On appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeal engaged in a de novo review of the $0 amount, and ordered that the verdict include $1,188,298.00 for lost future earnings. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the $0 jury verdict for that category of damages, holding that the Third Circuit should have applied a manifest error standard of review, and that under such a standard the jury’s verdict should have been upheld. Justice Kimball and Chief Justice Calogero concurred that the manifest error standard of review should apply, but dissented as to majority’s decision that the plaintiff should receive $0 for lost future earnings.
• Entergy Louisiana, LLC v. Louisiana Public Service Commission (opinion by Traylor, J.). Affirming an order of the Public Service Commission for Entergy Louisiana to refund to customers a charge subsequently found unallowable by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission: “No Louisiana jurisprudence specifically addresses the appropriateness of an LPSC order which implements a FERC-ordered exclusion of costs which, due to protracted litigation and/or FERC or LPSC proceedings, has become, in effect, retroactive. However, our review of case law and the LPSC proceedings herein leads us to conclude that the LPSC’s May 2006 refund order is not retroactive ratemaking. Practically speaking, once the FERC determined that Entergy Louisiana was including an unallowable, additional charge to the determination of capacity costs, any reparative action would necessarily have to occur in the future.” Slip op. at 15-16.
• Howard v. Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund (opinion by Knoll, J.; Calogero, C.J., concurring; Johnson, Weimer, JJ., dissenting). Plaintiffs, would-be heirs of Josephine Newcomb, filed suit against the legatee Tulane Educational Fund for the dissolution of Newcomb College. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal dismissed the lawsuit on the basis of Tulane’s peremptory exception of no right of action on the basis of lack of standing of the would-be heirs. The Louisiana Supreme Court vacated the Fourth Circuit’s judgment, and remanded to the district court to allow the plaintiffs to amend their petition to allege any facts that would justify their standing to bring their claims. The Court held “that the one who has the right to revoke a donation inter vivos or mortis causa for non-performance of a charge or condition should likewise have the corollary right to enforce it.” Slip op. at 14. The Court then concluded that, “[b]ecause the revocation of a universal donation mortis causa would rebound to the benefit of the intestate successors, would-be heirs have the right to bring suit to enforce the charge in conjunction with their right to seek revocation.” Slip op. at 15. The Court then held that the plaintiffs had not alleged sufficient facts to show that they were in this class of would-be heirs, and ordered that they be allowed to amend their petition to make such allegations. Chief Justice Calogero concurred to state additionally that he believed the question still remained open as to whether third-party beneficiaries of a donation mortis causa might have a right of action to seek enforcement of the donation. Justice Johnson dissented on the basis that the appeal court’s decision should be reversed and the trial court simply directed to build a record as to the standing issue. Justice Weimer dissented on the basis that, without reaching the standing issue, the district court’s original ruling - that the plaintiffs were not entitled to injunctive relief because the Newcomb testament did not require that Tulane maintain a separate institution to meet Mrs. Newcomb’s wishes.
• M.J. Farms Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (opinion by Knoll, J.; Johnson, J., concurring). Plaintiff sought damages for injuries to its property due to the operations of mineral lessees. The defendants sought to have the district court apply Act 312 of 2006 to the claims. The district court declared Act 312 unconstitutional. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that Act 312 does not strip the landowner of any vested rights, and is merely a procedural alteration of the law.
• Fransen v. City of New Orleans (opinion by Knoll, J.). Affirming in part judgment of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal that a New Orleans city ordinance providing for the levying of penalties to cover the costs of private collection efforts to recover delinquent ad valorem property taxes is unconstitutional. The Court declared the ordinance unconstitutional “with respect to any provisions that permit the City to place delinquent ad valorem property taxes on immovables for collection with an attorney or agent and/or that permit the City to proceed in any manner other than by the constitutionally mandated manner of tax sales to collect delinquent ad valorem property taxes on immovables. Article VII, § 25(A) of the Louisiana Constitution prohibits methods or proceedings other than tax sales to collect delinquent ad valorem property taxes. We further find the Ordinance, as codified, unconstitutional to the extent it imposes penalties, other than interest, upon delinquent ad valorem property taxes on immovables. The constitutional provision relating to property taxation permits the governmental subdivision to impose only the taxes, interest and costs in proceeding to sell the property for the delinquent ad valorem taxes.” Slip op. at 25.
• Borel v. Young (opinion by Weimer, J.; Calogero, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part; Traylor, Knoll, JJ., concurring in result only; Johnson, J., dissenting) (on rehearing). The Court held “that 1987 La. Acts. No. 915, § 1 did not change the character of the three-year limitation period in LSA-R.S. 9:5628 from a prescriptive period to one of peremption.” Slip op. at 2. The Court found, however, that the plaintiff’s claim was barred by the prescriptive period in the Medical Malpractice Act.
• State v. Romar (per curiam opinion). After defendant skipped out on his bond and failed to appear for trial on a DWI charge, he subsequently sought to have the charge quashed after expiration of the time for the state to complete its prosecution. The Louisiana Supreme Court held “that La.C.Cr.P. art. 579(A)(3) does not impose on the state the affirmative duty to search for a defendant who has failed to appear for trial after receiving actual notice.” Slip op. at 6. The Court concluded, “In these circumstances, Louisiana law affords the state the discretion to keep the attachment open as a trip wire against the day when a defendant again comes to the attention of the authorities.” Slip op. at 7. The Court held that the burden was on the defendant and his surety to avoid the consequences of his failure to appear.