The following opinions were released by the Louisiana Supreme Court on June 26, 2009:

• Guillory v. Lee (Opinion of the Court by Kimball, C.J.) (certiorari to La. 3d Cir.) (damages award - jury verdicts). Reversing judgment of the Third Circuit that increased damages award in various categories beyond that awarded by the jury verdict for damages arising from automobile accident, and that reversed district court finding that insurer had not acted arbitrarily and capriciously in not extending second good-faith settlement offer. The Supreme Court held that the appellate court erred in not deferring adequately to the jury’s vast discretion with regard to the quantum of damages, in light of the evidence in the record; and that the jury’s verdict regarding the insurer’s lack of arbitrary and capricious conduct was proper in light of the record evidence showing that there was no “undisputed amount” that the insurer refused to pay.
• Warren v. Louisiana Medical Mutual Insurance Co. (Opinion of the Court by Victory, J.; concurrence in result by Knoll, J.; Guidry, J., concurring in result without assigned reasons; Johnson, J., dissenting; Weimer, J., dissenting) (certiorari to La. 1st Cir.) (on rehearing) (medical malpractice - prescription). On rehearing, vacating its original holding and reversing the judgment of the court of appeal that a new plaintiff asserting a wrongful death claim could benefit from the original plaintiff’s interruption of prescription, and remanding for issuance of an order dismissing the new plaintiff’s claims as prescribed. The Supreme Court, relying on an earlier decision in Borel, held that the specific prescription provisions of the Medical Malpractice Act applied to trump the more general Codal provisions on interruption of prescription for joint tortfeasors. Concurring, Justice Knoll noted that Borel was a non-precedential plurality opinion, and that the plurality decision in this case reached the correct result but that it could only be supported by a finding of peremption under the plain language of the statute, not by Borel. Dissenting, Justice Johnson observed that the Medical Malpractice Act provisions examined by the Court in Borel were regarding addition of new defendants after the running of the prescriptive period, not the addition of new plaintiffs.
• State v. Hollins (Opinion of the Court by Victory, J.; dissent by Johnson, J.) (certiorari to La. 1st Cir.) (criminal appeal - accomplice testimony). Reversing the judgment of the First Circuit that the district court erred in refusing to give special instruction on accomplice testimony. The Supreme Court held that there was no special cautionary instruction required as to accomplice testimony where there was material corroboration of the accomplice’s testimony; and that the record evidence was sufficient to show that that the trial court’s determination that there was sufficient corroborating evidence was not an abuse of discretion.
• Naghi v. Brener (Opinion of the Court by Victory, J.; Knoll, Weimer, JJ., concurring in result; Kimball, C.J., dissenting; Johnson, J. dissenting) (certiorari to La. 4th Cir.) (peremption - legal malpractice). Reversing the judgment of the Fourth Circuit that the peremptive period for bringing legal malpractice actions may be subject to the relation-back mechanism of La. C.C.P. art. 1153. The Supreme Court held that the one-year period in La. R.S. § 9:5605 is peremptive, rather than prescriptive; and that the relation-back mechanism in art. 1153 only applies to avoid presciption, not peremption: “Because it is well established that nothing may interfere with the running of a peremptive period, … and avoiding the peremptive period certainly interferes with the running of that period, relation back of an amended or supplemental pleading adding a plaintiff is not allowed to avoid the running of a peremptive period such as that found in La. R.S. 9:5605.” Slip op. at 10. Dissenting, Chief Justice Kimball opined that the one-year period in 9:5606 was a prescriptive period.
• Gisclair v. Louisiana Tax Commission (Opinion of the Court by Knoll, J.) (certiorari to La. 1st Cir.) (tax assessment - subject matter jurisdiction). Reversing the judgment of the First Circuit that the state district courts have original subject matter jurisdiction over a tax recipient’s challenge to the assessment of public service property. The Supreme Court held that the challenge brought by a parish tax assessor to the Louisiana Tax Commission’s assessment of Entergy properties was a correctness challenge, rather than a legality challenge, and that district court’s therefore only had appellate jurisdiction over the challenge, not original subject matter jurisdiction. The original challenge must be brought to the Louisiana Tax Commission.
• Louisiana Safety Association of Timbermen Self Insurers Fund v. Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association (Opinion of the Court by Knoll, J.) (certiorari to La. 2d Cir.) (Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association law). Reversing the judgment of the Second Circuit that the Louisiana Safety Association of Timbermen (”the Fund”) was entitled to reimbursement from the Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association (”LIGA”) for unpaid claims from insolvent insurer Reliance Indemnity Company. The Supreme Court held that the Fund was an “insurer” under the statute, and that Reliance was its reinsurer, not an excess insurer, such that the Fund was not entitled to compensation from LIGA.
• Demma v. Automobile Club Inter-Insurance Exchange (Opinion of the Court by Weimer, J.; Victory, Guidry, JJ., concurring in result) (certiorari to La. 1st Cir.) (uninsured/underinsured motorist insurance - prescription). Reversing the judgment of the First Circuit that a UM/UIM carrier’s unconditional payment under La. R.S. § 22:658 was not sufficient to interrupt prescription. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that an acknowledgment of a delictual obligation need not be accompanied by an expressed intent to interrupt prescription; and that the carrier’s tender in this case was an unconditional tender sufficient to serve as an acknowledgment of the obligation that interrupted the prescriptive period.
• In re: Morvant (Opinion of the Court by Guidry, J.) (judiciary discipline). Rejecting the disciplinary recommendations of the Judiciary Commission. The Supreme Court held that Judge Morvant’s directing of fines to be paid to a drug use prevention organization of which he was a board member was not a violation so severe as to warrant disciplinary action.
• State v. Johnson (Per curiam opinion of the Court; Johnson, Knoll, Weimer, concurring without opinion) (certiorari to La. 1st Cir.) (post-conviction relief appeal - piecemeal appeals). Retaining jurisdiction in part, and remanding in part for further ruling by district court. The Supreme Court held that it would retain its jurisdiction over the state’s appeal of the district court’s ruling that the petitioner was factually innocent under the results of new DNA evidence, but would require a ruling byt he district court on the state’s request for rehearing of the district court’s ruling in favor of the petitioner on his Brady claims, so that the appeals of the claims would not go forward piecemeal.
• In re: Cruse (Per curiam opinion) (attorney disciplinary proceedings). Imposing a one year and one day suspension from the practice of law, and payment of restitution, for attorney’s failure to competently represent clients, failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness, failure to communicate with a client, failure to timely return an unearned fee, failure to withdraw from a representation, and other violations.
• In re: Humphrey (Per curiam opinion) (attorney disciplinary proceedings). Imposing disbarment on attorney who made false representations in a judicial proceeding, attempted to represent a client after being discharged, converted client property, engaged in a conflict of interest, and was held in contempt for filing pleadings containing offensive language and unsubstantiated allegations.
• In re: Holliday (Per curiam opinion) (attorney disciplinary proceedings). Imposing a three-year suspension from the practice of law, arising from the attorney’s traffic arrests and accidents, and vandalism incidents, while under the influence of alcohol.
• In re: Sharp (Per curiam opinion) (attorney disciplinary proceedings). Imposing sanction of disbarment on attorney, and restitution to former law firm, for conversion to his personal use of approximately $50,000 owed to his law firm by one of his clients.